# OpenAI disrupted Russian and Iranian covert influence operations using ChatGPT

Digest AI · Policy & Regulation · published 2026-10-08T00:00:00Z

Canonical: https://digestai.news/story/openai-disrupted-russian-and-iranian-covert-influence-operations-using

## Summary

OpenAI reported disrupting two covert influence operations—one from Russia and one from Iran—that used ChatGPT to support false-front entities over the past two and a half years. The Russian operation, nicknamed “Dark Clark,” used ChatGPT to draft internal reports, manage a fake research platform called the Social Research Center (SRC), and co-opt individuals in Latin America to spread disinformation targeting Ukraine and local leaders in Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador. The Iranian operation, dubbed “Bogus Bylines,” used ChatGPT to refine long-form articles and generate social media comments under seven fake journalist personas to pitch content to small and medium online outlets worldwide, focusing on the US-Iran conflict. Both operations used VPNs to access ChatGPT from restricted regions and employed AI to improve linguistic fluency and workflow efficiency. OpenAI assessed the Russian operation as Category 5 and the Iranian as Category 4 on its Breakout Scale, marking the first Category 5 disruption since its reporting began. The company shared information with relevant authorities and stated that exposing such operations makes them harder to sustain.

## Key points

- OpenAI disrupted a Russian operation (Dark Clark) and an Iranian operation (Bogus Bylines) using ChatGPT for covert influence
- The Russian operation used ChatGPT to manage a fake think tank (SRC) and co-opt Latin American individuals to spread disinformation
- The Iranian operation used seven fake journalist personas to pitch articles to online outlets about the US-Iran conflict

## Why it matters

These disclosures show how AI can be used to scale and sophistication influence operations, highlighting the need for detection and responsible disclosure to defend democratic processes and public discourse.

## Sources

1. [Disrupting AI-enabled “false front” operations](https://openai.com/index/disrupting-ai-enabled-false-front-operations) (OpenAI, 2026-10-08, primary source)

## Cite

Digest AI, "OpenAI disrupted Russian and Iranian covert influence operations using ChatGPT", 8 October 2026, https://digestai.news/story/openai-disrupted-russian-and-iranian-covert-influence-operations-using

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