OpenAI disrupted Russian and Iranian covert influence operations using ChatGPT
OpenAI reported disrupting two covert influence operations—one from Russia and one from Iran—that used ChatGPT to support false-front entities over the past two and a half years. The Russian operation, nicknamed “Dark Clark,” used ChatGPT to draft internal reports, manage a fake research platform called the Social Research Center (SRC), and co-opt individuals in Latin America to spread…
Key points
- OpenAI disrupted a Russian operation (Dark Clark) and an Iranian operation (Bogus Bylines) using ChatGPT for covert influence
- The Russian operation used ChatGPT to manage a fake think tank (SRC) and co-opt Latin American individuals to spread disinformation
- The Iranian operation used seven fake journalist personas to pitch articles to online outlets about the US-Iran conflict
Disrupting AI-enabled “false front” operations
OpenAI · 8 October 2026
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